Handsignaller Level 2 Certification

Correct: Operating rules and Federal Railroad Administration safety standards require that any condition likely to affect the safety of train movements must be reported immediately to the Train Dispatcher or Block Operator. This immediate notification allows the dispatcher to warn other trains in the area, implement speed restrictions, or stop traffic entirely to prevent a derailment. Providing the exact location, such as a milepost or physical landmark, is essential for the dispatcher to coordinate protection and repairs effectively.

Incorrect: The strategy of waiting until the next station or interlocking to report a defect creates a significant safety gap where following trains remain unaware of the hazard. Choosing to delay the report until the end of a shift via a written log fails to address the immediate risk to life and equipment. Opting to use a personal cell phone to contact maintenance personnel directly violates communication protocols and bypasses the Train Dispatcher, who is the sole authority responsible for controlling train movements and ensuring track protection.

Takeaway: Track defects must be reported immediately to the Train Dispatcher to allow for the prompt protection of all rail traffic.

Correct: Adhesion is the friction between the locomotive or car wheels and the steel rails that allows for controlled deceleration. When leaves are crushed by train wheels, they release oils and pectin that create a highly lubricated, ‘teflon-like’ coating on the rail head. This significantly lowers the coefficient of friction. If the braking force applied by the air brake system exceeds the available adhesion at the rail, the wheels will lose their grip and slide, which drastically increases the distance required to stop the train and can cause flat spots on the wheels.

Incorrect: The strategy of assuming debris increases rolling resistance to assist in stopping is incorrect because the lubricating properties of the organic matter far outweigh any physical resistance. Focusing on thermal expansion of the rail head or track alignment issues misidentifies the immediate physical problem, which is the loss of traction at the wheel-rail interface rather than structural track failure. Opting for the theory that moisture increases the coefficient of friction is a misconception, as moisture combined with organic matter is the primary catalyst for reduced adhesion and slippery rail conditions.

Takeaway: Adhesion is the critical friction between wheels and rails; contaminants like leaves reduce this friction and significantly extend stopping distances.

Correct: According to FRA regulations and LIRR operating rules, mandatory directives must be repeated verbatim by the receiver to ensure absolute accuracy. The dispatcher must then validate this repetition by stating ‘That is correct’ and providing the effective time and their initials to authorize the movement.

Incorrect: Relying on a simple acknowledgment with the word ‘Roger’ is insufficient because it does not verify that the specific details of the directive were understood. The strategy of providing a summarized version is prohibited because railroad safety requires word-for-word precision to eliminate any subjective interpretation. Choosing to record the instructions and wait for a timetable cross-reference is a secondary check that does not satisfy the regulatory requirement for verbal repetition and dispatcher confirmation.

Takeaway: Mandatory directives must be repeated verbatim and confirmed by the dispatcher with the time and initials to be legally valid.

Correct: Operating rules mandated by the Federal Railroad Administration and specific railroad authorities require that any communication affecting the safety of a train movement must be repeated by the receiving employee. This repeat-back process is essential to verify that the crew has accurately captured the specific locations, speed limits, or hazards described by the Dispatcher, preventing catastrophic misunderstandings of track conditions.

Incorrect: Relying on a simple acknowledgment or radio click is insufficient because it provides no verification that the Engineer understood the specific limits of the track hazard. The strategy of using a cellular device to contact the Conductor violates rules requiring the use of designated radio channels for movement-related instructions and fails to immediately inform the person operating the controls. Choosing to maintain normal speed until a physical sign is seen is a dangerous practice that ignores the Dispatcher’s responsibility to impose immediate restrictions when a track defect is reported.

Takeaway: Safety-critical communications must be repeated back word-for-word to ensure the train crew accurately understands all track conditions and restrictions.

Correct: Under Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) guidelines and LIRR operating rules, the failure of a safety-critical device like an alerter requires immediate notification to the Dispatcher. To continue movement, a second qualified employee must be stationed in the cab to provide constant observation and ensure the train can be stopped if the Engineer becomes incapacitated.

Incorrect: The strategy of simply reducing speed to 15 MPH does not mitigate the risk of an unmonitored operator and fails to meet the specific safety redundancy requirements for alerter failures. Choosing to stop the train immediately on a main track without attempting to establish the required safety protocols can cause unnecessary service disruptions and potential hazards. Relying solely on other functional systems like cab signaling is insufficient because those systems do not monitor the physical alertness or responsiveness of the operator.

Takeaway: Alerter failures require immediate Dispatcher notification and a second qualified person in the cab to maintain safe operations.

Correct: Under LIRR Operating Rules, Restricted Speed is defined as a speed that allows the train to stop within one-half the range of vision short of a train, obstruction, derail, broken rail, or switch not properly lined. Additionally, the rule strictly mandates that the speed must not exceed 15 MPH. This dual requirement ensures that even if an obstruction appears at the limit of visibility, the Engineer has sufficient braking distance to stop safely.

Incorrect: Maintaining a fixed speed without adjusting for visibility distance is dangerous because the rule specifically requires the ability to stop within half the visible distance. Using a 20 MPH limit is incorrect as it exceeds the maximum speed permitted under the LIRR definition of Restricted Speed. Requiring a full stop and a Form D is an unnecessary procedural delay because the signal aspect itself provides the authority to move, provided the speed restrictions are followed.

Takeaway: Restricted Speed requires stopping within half the range of vision and must never exceed 15 MPH on the LIRR system.

Correct: The diagonal aspect in position light signaling represents an Approach indication. Under LIRR rules, this requires the engineer to be prepared to stop at the next signal. It also mandates an immediate reduction to Medium Speed if the train is currently exceeding that limit.

Incorrect: Assuming the signal indicates a clear path at maximum authorized speed is incorrect because vertical lights signify a Clear aspect. The strategy of maintaining Medium Speed until the next signal without being prepared to stop describes an Approach Medium. Opting to reduce to Slow Speed immediately is a misinterpretation of the speed requirement for this specific diagonal configuration.

Takeaway: A diagonal position light signal indicates an Approach aspect, requiring immediate reduction to Medium Speed and preparation to stop.

Correct: In Centralized Traffic Control territory, controlled signals govern the movement of trains. When a signal displays a Stop indication, it cannot be passed without specific authorization from the Train Dispatcher. Once verbal authority is granted, the movement must be made at Restricted Speed. This speed requirement ensures the Engineer can stop the train within half the range of vision, short of other trains, obstructions, or improperly lined switches, which is critical for safety when signal protection is bypassed.

Incorrect: The strategy of waiting for a specific time interval before proceeding is incorrect as modern CTC rules require direct communication and authority from the Dispatcher to ensure no conflicting movements exist. Opting for a written Form D is a procedure typically used for different types of track authority or in non-signaled territory rather than the standard verbal bypass used for controlled signals in CTC. Focusing on the Yardmaster for authority is a violation of protocol because the Train Dispatcher has exclusive jurisdiction over main track movements and interlocking signals within CTC limits.

Takeaway: Passing a Stop signal in CTC territory requires verbal authority from the Train Dispatcher and movement at Restricted Speed.

Correct: Under LIRR and FRA-aligned operating rules, a Main Track is a track designated by the timetable where movements are authorized by signals or the Train Dispatcher. In contrast, a Yard Track is used for switching and storage, where movements are typically made at Restricted Speed, meaning the crew must be able to stop within half the range of vision, and they do not require formal dispatcher authorization for routine moves.

Incorrect: The strategy of placing Main Track movements under Yardmaster control incorrectly identifies the hierarchy of railroad authority, as Yardmasters only manage specific yard limits. Relying on the idea that both track types require identical signal protection ignores the reality that many yard tracks are non-signaled and rely on visual rules. The approach of giving Yard Track movements priority over Main Track movements at interlockings is incorrect because Main Track movements, especially scheduled passenger service, are prioritized to maintain the timetable.

Takeaway: Main tracks require formal dispatcher or signal authorization, while yard tracks operate under Restricted Speed without such formal authority.

Correct: In accordance with railroad safety regulations and operating rules, the discovery of any defect that could jeopardize the safety of train movements requires the employee to immediately protect the affected area to prevent other trains from entering. This is followed by immediate notification to the Train Dispatcher, who can then issue formal track blocks or speed restrictions to ensure the safety of all personnel and equipment.

Incorrect: The strategy of proceeding to the next station before reporting is incorrect because it leaves the hazard unprotected for other approaching trains. Relying on a personal inspection to determine speed limits is a violation of protocol, as only qualified engineering or maintenance-of-way personnel are authorized to certify track integrity. Choosing to wait for a following train is unsafe and inefficient, as it delays the necessary notification to the Dispatcher and fails to provide immediate protection for the right-of-way.

Takeaway: Employees must immediately protect the track and notify the Dispatcher when discovering any defect that threatens safe train operations.

Correct: Mechanical tamping, lining, and surfacing operations disturb the consolidated ballast section, which significantly reduces the lateral resistance of the track. To prevent track buckling or geometry shifts, LIRR and FRA standards require a temporary speed restriction (Slow Order) to be placed on the affected area. This allows the ballast to re-settle and compact under the weight of passing trains, a process known as tonnage stabilization, before the track can safely handle higher speeds.

Incorrect: The strategy of relying on a visual inspection is insufficient because it cannot detect the loss of lateral resistance within the ballast stones that occurs during mechanical disturbance. Simply conducting work with automated machinery does not eliminate the need for restrictions, as the mechanical process itself is what causes the initial instability. Opting for a flat twenty-four-hour restriction at Restricted Speed is inefficient and does not align with standard tonnage-based or graduated speed restoration protocols used in modern railroad operations.

Takeaway: Track stability is compromised during surfacing, necessitating temporary speed restrictions until the ballast is properly re-compacted by passing tonnage.

Correct: Standard operating rules require a safety stop at least 50 feet from the equipment to ensure knuckles are open and drawbars are properly aligned. After making the coupling at restricted speed (not exceeding 4 mph), a stretch test must be performed by gently pulling in the opposite direction to verify that the knuckles have mechanically locked.

Incorrect: The strategy of maintaining a speed of 8 mph is dangerous as it exceeds restricted speed and risks damaging the draft gear or causing a derailment. Choosing to have a ground person step between the rails while equipment is in close proximity is a severe safety violation that ignores ‘red zone’ protection protocols. Opting to push the cars 100 feet under high power is an ineffective way to verify a coupling, as only a stretch test in the opposite direction can confirm the mechanical lock of the knuckles.

Takeaway: Always stop 50 feet prior to coupling and perform a stretch test to verify a secure mechanical connection.

Correct: Standard operating rules and Federal Railroad Administration safety protocols require that verbal instructions be repeated accurately and in full. If an error or omission occurs during the repeat-back, the communication is considered invalid and must be corrected immediately. The engineer must ensure a complete and correct understanding through a full repeat-back to prevent a mental model error where assumptions replace verified facts.

Incorrect: Choosing to proceed at restricted speed while visually checking for the diversion is insufficient because it bypasses the mandatory verification of the directive. The strategy of continuing the movement based on cab notes while asking for confirmation over the radio creates a period of unauthorized movement. Opting to wait until the next interlocking or stop to address the communication failure is dangerous as the train would already be operating under incomplete and unverified instructions.

Takeaway: Effective error mitigation requires immediate correction of communication discrepancies through a complete and accurate repeat-back of all mandatory directives.

Correct: LIRR Operating Rules require that any emergency brake application must be immediately communicated via radio. The Engineer must broadcast the word Emergency three times to clear the channel and alert all other trains in the vicinity. This protocol ensures that following or adjacent trains stop immediately, preventing potential collisions if the stopped train has derailed or fouled other tracks.

Incorrect: Relying on a private frequency for a mechanical report fails to provide the necessary immediate warning to other trains in the area. The strategy of waiting for a conductor’s confirmation delays critical safety alerts that must happen the moment the train stops. Choosing to issue a standard status update without the emergency prefix violates the requirement to prioritize safety-critical information during an unplanned stop.

Takeaway: Crews must immediately broadcast a triple-emergency radio call to protect the train and surrounding tracks after an emergency brake application.

Correct: Centrifugal force is the outward force experienced by a train as it travels through a curve. To counteract this force and prevent the train from leaning excessively or derailing toward the outside of the curve, the outer rail is set higher than the inner rail, a design feature known as superelevation. This banking allows gravity to pull the train inward, balancing the outward lateral force and ensuring the resultant force remains centered between the rails.

Incorrect: The strategy of focusing on centripetal force as the outward threat is incorrect because centripetal force is actually the inward force that keeps an object moving in a circle. Relying on widening the track gauge is a misunderstanding of track geometry, as gauge widening is used to prevent wheel binding in tight curves rather than managing lateral forces. Choosing to emphasize gravitational force on the inner rail ignores the primary danger of outward lateral displacement. Opting for longitudinal force as the main concern confuses the physics of curve negotiation with the management of train slack and longitudinal dynamics.

Takeaway: Superelevation counteracts centrifugal force by banking the track, ensuring the train remains stable and within safe lateral force limits during curve negotiation.

Correct: Under LIRR and FRA safety standards, the immediate priority in an emergency is to prevent a secondary collision. This is achieved by using the emergency radio call to alert the Train Dispatcher and other trains, followed by providing physical protection for all tracks that may be obstructed. This ensures that the dispatcher can stop all movements in the affected area and coordinate with emergency responders effectively.

Incorrect: Prioritizing passenger evacuation before securing the tracks risks a collision with an approaching train on the adjacent track. The strategy of attempting to clear an obstruction without first notifying the dispatcher ignores the immediate danger to other rail traffic. Relying on visual signals from other trains before communicating is a reactive approach that fails to utilize the proactive safety measures required by the Book of Rules. Focusing only on maintaining the schedule during a fouling event violates fundamental safety principles regarding track integrity.

Takeaway: Immediate emergency radio notification and track protection are the primary requirements to prevent secondary accidents during a railroad emergency.

Correct: LIRR operating rules establish that the Conductor is the supervisor of the train and all employees assigned to it. However, the rules explicitly state that both the Conductor and the Engineer are equally and jointly responsible for the safety of the train, the observance of signals, and the strict adherence to all operating rules and speed restrictions.

Incorrect: The strategy of placing sole responsibility on the Engineer ignores the Conductor’s role as the designated person in charge of the train and its overall safety. Simply suggesting the Train Dispatcher assumes direct supervision of the crew’s physical actions misinterprets the Dispatcher’s role in directing movements versus managing onboard personnel. Choosing to believe the Engineer is exempt from liability when following a Conductor’s order fails to recognize the joint responsibility clause that requires both parties to independently ensure rule compliance.

Takeaway: The Conductor supervises the train, but the Engineer and Conductor share joint responsibility for safety and rule compliance.

Correct: LIRR Operating Rules require that a train must not leave a station where it is scheduled to stop before its scheduled leaving time. This ensures passengers can rely on the published schedule and maintains movement integrity.

Incorrect: Relying solely on the Conductor’s signal that boarding is complete fails to account for passengers arriving at the scheduled time. The strategy of departing early and then slowing down violates the fundamental rule against early departure from a scheduled stop. Opting for a verbal waiver from the Train Dispatcher is incorrect because Dispatchers cannot authorize a passenger train to ignore published Timetable times.

Takeaway: Scheduled passenger trains must never depart a station before their designated Timetable time to ensure service consistency and safety.

Correct: The Book of Rules is the foundation of railroad safety. It provides the mandatory procedures required by the FRA to ensure every movement is conducted safely and uniformly. This consistency reduces the likelihood of human error. It ensures that all personnel understand their specific responsibilities in any given scenario to protect lives and property.

Incorrect: Treating rules as suggestions undermines the entire safety culture and creates hazardous conditions where movements are no longer predictable. Focusing only on equipment protection fails to recognize that the primary objective of railroad regulations is the protection of human life. The strategy of using rules as a secondary reference is dangerous because rules must govern every aspect of operation, regardless of whether technology is functioning correctly.

Takeaway: Operating rules are mandatory safety requirements designed to ensure uniform and predictable behavior across the entire railroad network.

Correct: Operating rules require that both switches of a hand-operated crossover be lined for the intended movement before the movement starts. This protocol prevents the train from being trapped between switches or causing a derailment if the second switch is not properly aligned for the exit. Ensuring the entire route is set before movement begins is a fundamental safety requirement for hand-operated switches.

Incorrect: The strategy of lining only the first switch and moving halfway through creates a risk of the train overshooting or being unable to stop if the second switch is obstructed or malfunctioning. Relying on trailing through a switch without verifying its position is dangerous and generally prohibited for hand-operated crossovers unless they are specifically designated as spring switches. Opting to line switches one at a time while the movement is in progress fails to ensure a clear and safe route for the entire length of the equipment before the movement commences.

Takeaway: Both switches of a hand-operated crossover must be properly lined before any movement begins through the crossover.